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Constitutional Authority in an Age
of Moral Indeterminacy
RALPH F. GAEBLER*
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Problems, Augustinian Prospects (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990), 173 pp.; $25.00.
Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., Reason and Democracy (Durham & London:
Duke University Press, 1990), xi + 275 pp.; $39.50. Paperback text ed.
(Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1990), $17.95.
In a memorable passage from his book, The Tempting of America, The
Political Seduction of the Law, former Judge Robert Bork describes the
"rising flood" of constitutional theory as a "puzzling" phenomenon that
reflects a "deep-seated malaise, and quite possibly, a state of approaching
decadence." ' He goes on to praise the "older constitutional commentators,
secure in their commonsense lawyers' view of the Constitution," ' 2 and to
criticize "modem theorists," whose concepts are "abstruse," sources "phil-
osophical," and arguments "convoluted." 3 In Bork's view, all such philos-
ophizing is a thinly veiled attempt to politicize law in order to advance one
agenda or another in what he calls "the war for control of our legal
culture." 4
Bork's puzzlement is attributable to the law school's traditional isolation
from political philosophy.s This isolation is unfortunate, for all approaches
* Assistant Librarian, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington. A.B., 1981,
Brown University; J.D., 1984, Indiana University; M.L.S., 1985, Indiana University. The
author wishes to thank John Ix for his careful editorial attention.
1. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEmPTNG OF .AMERICA, THE PoLIcAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
133-34 (1990).
2. Id. at 134.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2.
5. In his full-length treatment of the history of American law schools, Robert Stevens
concludes that law schools have always given priority to training lawyers and have therefore
been somewhat isolated intellectually from all other disciplines within the larger university
community. He states, "the American law school was founded and developed as a professional
school stressing the knowledge needed to pass the bar examination and to succeed in practice
.... Legal education's heritage was one of an inherent conflict between the professional and
the scholarly." ROBERT Sm=vEs, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S
TO THE 1980s 266 (1983). He continues, "it was [always] difficult to fit a scholarly orientation
into an institution designed primarily for teaching purposes," and the "academic lawyer" has
remained "primarily a generalist teacher committed to producing generalist lawyers." Id. at
270.
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to constitutional interpretation, including that which former Judge Bork
endorses, rest on logically prior assumptions about what legitimizes the
Constitution as a source of law. And it is just this concern for describing
the foundations of political obligation that characterizes normative political
philosophy.
Two recent books exemplify the good work that contemporary political
philosophy has to offer. As its title suggests, Moral Foundations of Con-
stitutional Thought: Current Problems, Augustinian Prospects, by Graham
Walker, explicitly attempts to establish the normative legitimacy of the
Constitution.6 In contrast, Reason and Democracy, by Thomas A. Spragens,
Jr., deals only in general with the legitimacy of democratic liberalism, yet
the argument it presents is readily adaptable for use in understanding the
normative foundation of the Constitution.7
These two books create an interesting comparison because they are
diametrically opposed in some respects, yet quite sympathetic in others.
Walker and Spragens unite in their rejection of both moral certainty and
moral relativism, seeking instead to base their theories of political obligation
on a middle ground that is genuinely normative, yet acknowledges the
existence of moral indeterminacy. Moreover, both writers do so by claiming
that the good can serve as a normative end of political life even though it
is beyond human reason to grasp it perfectly.
Yet Walker and Spragens converge on this position from opposite ends
of the philosophical spectrum. For Walker, the good remains indeterminate
in human affairs because humankind is naturally disinclined to follow it.
However, he does not deny the independent existence of goodness. There-
fore, his argument remains within the tradition of moral absolutism, or as
he prefers to call it, "moral realism. ' 8 Conversely, for Spragens, the good
is normative because decisions about what is to be done have a rational
basis. But he does not deny that what counts as good is ultimately a matter
of preference. Therefore, he remains within the tradition of moral relativism.
Together, these two writers inadvertently demonstrate that there is significant
room for reconciliation between two traditions that, up to now, have been
viewed as logically inconsistent. This is good news for the Constitution,
despite former Judge Bork's misguided grumpiness about the insidious
influence of political philosophy in law.
In Moral Foundations of Constitutional Thought, Walker takes the po-
sition that constitutional theory must be normative because the Constitution
itself is "normative by definition"; it prescribes "the authoritative architec-
6. GRAHM WATKER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT: CURRENT PROB-
LEMS, AUGUSTINIAN PROSPECTS (1990).
7. THOMAS A. SPRAGENS, JR., REASON AND DEMOCRACY (1990).
8. WALKER, supra note 6, at 13.
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ture for American public life." 9 Its text makes explicit what is implicit in
the very nature of constitutionalism. The Preamble, he notes, is replete with
moral objectives: "to form a more perfect union, establish Justice, ...
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty . . .
In addition, specific provisions speak of "cruel" punishment," "just com-
pensation," 12 "equal protection,"' 3 and "due process."' 4 In Walker's view,
these phrases inevitably point beyond the Constitution as a legal document
to an authoritative foundation of values. Those values must exist to vindicate
the very enterprise of constitutionally ordered public life, as well as any
specific understanding of our Constitution and how it should be interpreted.
From this basic orientation, Walker proceeds to assess the deficiencies of
what he describes as moral nihilism or conventionalism.'5 According to
Walker, conventionalists believe that "the good cannot, in the final analysis,
be treated as anything more than a contingent human artifact.' '1 6 This
school includes skeptics such as Bork 7 whose moral relativism leads them
to endorse simple majoritarianism as the sole legitimator of binding political
acts.' 8 John Hart Ely also qualifies as a conventionalist because he too
derives his process norms from the principle of democracy,19 the authority
of which is taken simply as an historical datum. Other historicists whom
Walker places in this category include Michael Perry" and Alexander
9. Id. at 10.
10. U.S. CoNsT. pmbl.
11. Id. at amend. VIII.
12. Id. at amend. V.
13. Id. at amend. XIV, § 1.
14. Id. at amends. V, XIV, § 1.
15. WALKER, supra note 6, at 12-13.
16. Id. at 25.
17. See RoEERT H. BoaK, TRADITON AND MoRArr iN CONs=rrloNAL LAw (1984);
Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEoO L.
REv. 823 (1986); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
18. As espoused by Bork and other constitutional conservatives, majoritarianism is not,
strictly speaking, a theory of political obligation at all. Majoritarianism simply holds that since
the good is a matter of preference, majority vote is the only fair method to decide which ends
political society should pursue under the Constitution. The consent theory of constitutional
legitimacy might be viewed as an application of this principle to the question of whether a
constitution should be adopted at all. However, consent theory can also be viewed as a
conceptually distinct claim that each individual must voluntarily consent to citizenship before
the state can legitimately bind him. Since Walker's argument addresses majoritarianism as a
theory of political obligation, he must also regard it as incorporating the first sense of consent
theory.
19. See Jom4 H. ELY, D mocRAcY AND DISusT: A THEoRY oF JuDIcL. REvIEw 43-72
(1980); John H. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J.
399 (1978).
20. See MICE[AL J. PERRY, THE CONS-TIUTIN, THE CouRTs, AND HumAN RiOirs 9-36
(1982); MiciAEL J. PERRY, MoRAxrY, Pourmcs, AND LAW: A BICENTENNILL ESSAY 121-79
(1988); Michael J. Perry, A Critique of the "Liberal" Political-Philosophical Project, 28 Wm.
& MARY L. REv. 205 (1987); Michael J. Perry, Moral Knowledge, Moral Reasoning, Moral
Relativism: A "Naturalist" Perspective, 20 GA. L. REv. 995 (1986).
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Bickel. 21 Each of these theorists anchors morality in tradition, which is
historically contingent. Thus morality has no intrinsic content. It is merely
the product of culturally molded human will. Walker completes his catalog
of conventionalists with Walter Berns, 22 whose work he regards as singular.
He concedes that Berns views the Constitution as the embodiment of
fundamental, moral ends. However, these ends are derived from Hobbes'
"fundamentally nonmoral theory of the good."23 In Berns' theory,
[o]pinions of good and bad acquire a semblance of normative force
when a human reasoner calculates their conduciveness to domestic
peace .... [But s]ince natural rights values thus rest upon an instru-
mental calculation whose outcome is not given in the nature of reality
but stipulated ... by a calculator, their normative status turns out to
be at base a matter of convention.Y
Walker finds much to admire in conventionalism. Most important, it
accounts for moral indeterminacy, that is, our subjective experience of
moral ambiguity. Consequently, conventionalism tends to endorse judicial
self-criticism and prudence, although its proponents are by no means unan-
imous in calling for judicial self-restraint. Walker himself supports prudent
self-restraint, yet in the end he completely rejects all conventionalist theories
on the ground that they are logically "incoherent." They are illogical, he
claims, because they deny the existence of that which must exist to justify
their own normative claims. For example, Walker asks how Bork can argue
that majoritarianism is the legitimating principle of the Constitution if he
also argues that there is no real moral standard legitimating majoritarian-
ism.Y We are left with a theory suspended in midair. Even historicist
theories that lean for support on the shoulders of tradition beg the question
of why we should honor tradition. By their own admission; according to
Walker, conventionalists ultimately place judges in the position they most
abhor, that of making decisions by imposing their own arbitrary view of
what the Constitution requires.
Thus we can summarize one of the basic propositions that Walker puts
forth in Moral Foundations. Constitutions, he asserts, must be normatively
grounded. Normativity, in turn, must be based on moral reality, not mere
convention. Therefore, constitutional government presupposes the existence
21. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, Tim MORuLTY OF CONSENT 23-30 (1975).
22. Walter Berns, Taking Rights Frivolously, in LIBERALISM RECONSIDERED 51 (Douglas
MacLean & Claudia Mills eds., 1983); Walter Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws
of Nature, 1982 Sue. CT. REv. 49; Walter Berns, The New Pursuit of Happiness, 86 PuB.
INTEREST 65 (1987).
23. WALKER, supra note 6, at 31.
24. Id. at 32.
25. And, one might add, if one were to stipulate majoritarianism's exclusive legitimacy,
how could Bork argue that there are any constitutional restraints on what a current majority
might want to do in derogation of the Constitution?
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of a morally real universe, "a reality whose existence is independent of
human artifice."' ' Walker concludes that the failure of conventionalists
properly to ground their normative theories in this reality leads them to an
impasse that dooms their projects to incoherence.
When Walker turns from conventionalism to moral realism, a different
set of problems arises. Of course, although he finds the conventionalists
fundamentally misdirected, Walker finds the moral realists fundamentally
sound. Yet he recognizes in their work certain ontological and epistemolog-
ical problems that leave their theories incomplete. He turns to the political
ethics of Saint Augustine both to clarify and to rectify those problems in
a manner that will leave constitutional philosophy, and therefore constitu-
tional law, on a surer footing.
To analyze moral realism, Walker delves into the work of Michael S.
Moore, 27 Sotirios Barber,28 and John Courtney Murray. 29 However, it is
primarily through his treatment of Moore that Walker probes the episte-
mological and ontological shortcomings of contemporary moral realism.
Moore, like Barber and Murray, is committed to moral realism, or the idea
that moral truth exists independent of human perception. Moore argues
that the existence of such independent order need not be proved; it is
enough that "our practices with regard to thinking about and describing
the world [whether scientifically or morally] are realist in their metaphysical
presuppositions. "3 0 Nevertheless, to account for the moral indeterminacy
we experience, Moore also argues that we can never get an unmediated
glimpse of the independent order of goodness. In this respect, he is more
fervently committed to subjectivism than even the conventionalists, who
must claim to have such a glimpse of the order of things to know that
there is no moral reality. He also differs from Murray, who, as a Thomist,3'
believes that natural law is fully intelligible to humankind. Moore and
Walker reject this correspondence epistemology because it fails to account
for moral indeterminacy. In its place, Moore espouses coherence episte-
26. WALKER, supra note 6, at 24.
27. See Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
277 (1985) [hereinafter Natural Law Theory]; Michael S. Moore, Metaphysics, Epistemology
and Legal Theory, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 453 (1987) (reviewing RONALD M. DwoRMIN, A MATTER
oF PRINCIPLE (1985)).
28. See SoTmios A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984).
29. See JoN C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMRicAN PROPOSITION (1960).
30. Natural Law Theory, supra note 27, at 311, quoted in WALKER, supra note 6, at 48.
31. St. Thomas Aquinas held that an intellectual quality called synderesis enabled anyone
to intuit the first principle of reason, namely the proposition that '[good should be done
and sought after; evil is to be avoided."' Vernon J. Bourke, Thomas Aquinas, St., in 8 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILosoPHY 105, 112 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (quoting THomAs AquiNAs,
SummA THEoLoaukE (c. 1265-73)). From this proposition, he thought one could derive "sufficient
knowledge of what is morally right ... to be able to regulate [one's] own actions." Id.
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mology, in which moral precepts are evaluated according to how well they
cohere with everything else one believes. Since there is no method by which
humankind can directly glimpse moral reality, this form of evaluation is all
that remains.
Walker's critique of Moore focuses on the theory of coherence episte-
mology, which, in his view, suffers from irreconcilable tensions. First, he
notes Moore's confident assertion that coherence checking can lead to ever
better moral theory. This assertion implies that we can somehow know that
moral theory and moral reality are converging, which in turn implies a
direct knowledge of moral reality, which Moore denies we can have. As a
corollary, Walker argues that such confidence in coherence checking leads
Moore to endorse a degree of judicial activism that is troubling both on
prudential grounds and in light of Moore's own fundamental skepticism
about our ability to glimpse the good directly. 32 Untroubled moral confidence
can lead judges into several types of error, notably the tendency to collapse
morality and law and the tendency to ignore historical revelations of moral
reality. To Walker, the importance of history is not its embodiment of
cultural convention or tradition, but its potential for bequeathing to us past
accomplishments in moral reasoning, derived from glimpses of moral reality,
that we can apply to our own problems. Walker notes in his own defense
that in turning to St. Augustine, he uses history in this way.
In addition, Walker criticizes Moore's epistemology for reintroducing
conventionalism into constitutional theory. After all, coherence checking
amounts to no more than consulting our moral practices to determine what
is morally good. Walker wonders how we can be sure that coherence
checking will lead us to converge on the truly good rather than the truly
evil if the coherence we seek is purely cultural. As a moral realist, Walker
is concerned that coherence checking will be distorted by the influence of
evil desires and thus lead to a moral system that does not correspond to
moral reality. In short, Moore equates moral knowledge with other types
of knowledge by showing that neither is epistemologically secure. Walker's
reply is that Moore's argument succeeds in undermining the "real" basis
of all knowledge, but fails to secure the "real" basis of moral knowledge.
32. WALKER, supra note 6, at 48-54. Walker's criticism focuses on the fact that Moore's
theory is vulnerable in practice because it fails to account for the possibility of egregious
judicial error. However, I believe there is another problem here as well. Since judges have no
special moral insight, their authority to interpret the Constitution derives from the Constitution
itself. But what if some nonjudge has better moral insight? Are we not obligated to follow
the dictates of that person rather than those of the judge, even if they conflict? Although the
judge is authorized by the Constitution to render binding decisions, the Constitution is binding
only as a means to bring us closer to convergence with moral reality. If the moral insights of
a particularly sensitive nonjudge will get us there faster, they are still more authoritative than
the judge's decisions. The problem here is that Moore's theory inevitably reduces the authority
of the Constitution to a purely instrumental level.
[Vol. 68:133
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This follows from focusing on how we know rather than on the question
of what is to be known.
Thus we can summarize Walker's second major proposition, namely, that
a moral realist theory must account for moral indeterminacy in ontological,
rather than in, epistemological, terms. To put this another way, it must
account for our subjective experience of moral ambiguity in terms of the
nature of moral reality itself, rather than in terms of our perception of it.
Only with an ontologically grounded theory, he says, can we avoid the
impasse of contemporary moral realist theory, which either ignores moral
indeterminacy (Murray) or lapses into conventionalism and judicial hubris
(Moore).
Having thus assessed the character and shortcomings of contemporary
conventionalism and moral realism, Walker undertakes an explication of
Augustinian ethics in the hope that it will provide the key to "detaching
'moral realism's' assets from its liabilities. ' 33 Walker's description of Au-
gustinian ethics can be briefly summarized as follows. God is the sole,
immutable good. His power pervades all things in nature, animate and
inanimate, directing each to its proper end. Knowledge of this goodness is
open to the mind without mediation through "intellectual sight," a kind of
knowledge just as empirical as sense impressions, but which differs in that
its objects are immutable and eternal rather than physical and finite. Human
nature stands at the apex of creation and is uniquely excellent in that it
can recognize and voluntarily adhere to the immutable good itself. Thus
human nature, in its pristine form, has perfect knowledge of and inclination
toward the good.
Yet humankind voluntarily turned away from the good in the vain hope
of becoming more autonomous. This turning away, of course, was embodied
in the Fall, which according to St. Augustine led to the Protagorean
misconception that man is the measure of all things. With the Fall, human
nature was vitiated and there occurred a contraction of nature. That is, the
connection between human nature and immutable goodness was attenuated,
but not broken. In ethical terms, St. Augustine argues that humankind can
still glimpse the immutably good but is disinclined to follow it.
Augustinian ethics places moral indeterminacy on an ontological footing
by claiming that it derives not from humankind's inability to see the good
directly, but from its vitiated disinclination to behave in accordance with
it.34 This insight has several consequences. First, it leads to greater skepticism
33. Id. at 22.
34. Walker argues that Barber's work is incipiently Augustinian because it, too, makes
much of humankind's disinclination to follow the law. Thus he finds Barber's unapologetic
endorsement of judicial activism inconsistent with the implications of his theory.
19921
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about judicial activism, which poses the danger of unchecked judicial
tyranny. Second, it restores the usefulness of historical insights into moral
reality and checks the impulse to reconstruct moral goodness in each judicial
mind.3 5 Perhaps most important, it emphasizes the distance between law
and morality. I say distance, rather than separation, because Walker's St.
Augustine does not deny that law and morality are related. He claims only
that politics and, therefore, law have the "daunting," "unromantic," and
"unenviable" task of "managing a fundamentally mixed multitude" of
people whose very nature precludes them from being completely moral in
this world.3 6 Thus the rule of law remains at base an instrument of political
order rather than a guide to true virtue.3 7
Walker presents a St. Augustine who is a moral realist, but also a tough
pragmatist. Does this version of skeptical moral realism resolve the theo-
retical impasses which led Walker to undertake this project in the first
place? On the one hand, Walker's argument does graft the normative force
of moral realism to the perception of moral indeterminacy that underlies
conventionalism. On the other hand, he provides no convincing reason why
one should necessarily buy into St. Augustine's belief system. Walker
emphasizes that St. Augustine made no leap of faith, but arrived at his
beliefs as the best explanation for the reality he knew. He suggests we
follow the same path when he remarks that "[q]uite apart from theological
considerations, the need to make sense as coherently as possible of human
experience ought to make us receptive to an ontological outlook with this
kind of basic logic." 38 However, there is a problem here as to where St.
Augustine's theology leaves off and his philosophy begins; to what extent
must one accept the former to utilize the latter? Even if St. Augustine made
no leap of faith, he did experience life in a particular way. For example,
he took the prophets to be divine revelation, something which, for the
modern mind, should not be a precondition to understanding the Consti-
tution's authority aright.
Another problem relates to the usefulness of Walker's insights as a source
of interpretive theory. Of course, Walker claims that his form of moral
realism allows the interpreter to take seriously the Constitution's explicit
moral aspirations as such. It does not "arbitrarily privileg[e] the conven-
tional prejudices, wants, and fears of [the framers'] particular moment in
history," nor treat the Constitution's moral provisions as "a malleable
rationale for the indeterminately evolving values of later generations. "3 9 On
35. In comparison, Moore argues that if a judge's moral conclusions conflict with conven-
tional morals, the judge should follow his own inclination. Id. at 53.
36. Id. at 108.
37. In contrast, Moore "regards the attainment of justice as the paramount function of
all civil law," and considers the Constitution as a "blueprint" of the just society. Id. at 54.
38. Id. at 141.
39. Id. at 154.
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the other hand, Augustinian ethics views politics, and therefore law, as
fundamentally "coerci[ve]," 40 designed to maintain peace in a world of
vitiated nature that can never achieve genuine goodness. This point is crucial
to Walker's critique of contemporary moral realism's urge to conflate law
and morals. Yet the question remains, how do the duty to act prudently
and the robust invocation of moral reality relate to each other? The problem
here is that Walker's conception of moral reality provides no principled
basis upon which to exercise prudence.
Walker argues that his form of moral realism does entail conclusions
about the sources, if not the method, of interpretation. This argument
proceeds from the observation that historical experience provides partial
and occasional glimpses of moral reality. Hence, the gleanings of this
experience, in the form of judicial precedent, accepted standards of decency,
and the framers' intent, furnish the proper sources of interpretive judgment.
But without some indication of how "intellectual sight" assists in separating
the morally real from the merely conventional of historical experience,
Walker's catalog of sources remains indistinguishable from those that any
purely conventionalist judge would consult.
One of Walker's primary contentions, as already mentioned, is that
conventionalist theories cannot be normative. This brings his argument into
conflict with that of Thomas Spragens, whose Reason and Democracy4 I is
an extended effort to repair precisely those aspects of conventionalism that
Walker finds fatal.
In Reason and Democracy, Spragens attempts to derive a theory of
political obligation from the idea that public life must be governed by a
characteristic pattern of procedures and institutions in order to reach the
end of human flourishing. Spragens defines "the good" in Aristotelian
terms as "the felicitous exercise of human capabilities and the satisfaction
of legitimate human wants. ' 42 To Spragens, it is this good which generates
a normative standard for the conduct of political life. ,
Why ought we to be motivated to pursue the good in political life at all?
Put another way, is the good sufficiently related to politics to be able to
serve as the source of a theory of political obligation? This is a threshold
question for any theory such as the one Spragens espouses. Spragens'
response is, first, that the good for each individual consists partly in the
practice of public life. No individual can live a solitary life, nor would he
be happy if he could. Second, since we are bound to live in communities,
some agreement on what is good is necessary, at least in certain areas. The
mechanism of political life need not be normative to the extent that a
40. Id. at 106.
41. SPRaGi~s, supra note 7.
42. Id. at 117.
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religious covenant is normative for those who voluntarily subscribe to it.
Rather, it is normative only in that it binds us to a particular process of
finding answers to the pressing problems of social existence.
The goal of Spragens' argument is to lay out the main features of the
process which constitutes the norm of political life. However, before taking
up the main thread of his argument, Spragens finds it necessary to address
a more fundamental question concerning the nature of reason and the
ontological status of the good.
The good, according to Spragens, is the final end of political life.
However, all members of a given political community will not agree on the
nature of goodness. This is because goodness is not something that can be
known through logical deduction, through measurement or calculation, but
rather is something we know only through experience. We can never know
it completely since we can neither experience everything nor remain in all
aspects the same throughout our lives. Moreover, even those who do share
the same experiences may have different conceptions of the good, since
those experiences must be filtered through different personalities before
acquiring a particular value. As Spragens puts it, "[o]nly in the rear view
mirror ... do we begin to understand the shape and dimensions of the
positive human good." 43 Our knowledge of the good is always "partial,"
"imperfect," and "piecemeal." The good, then, is something toward which
we orient ourselves, knowing that it can never be fully and permanently
manifest.
Because of the good's unstable ontological status, Spragens does not
argue that it is directly normative, in the sense that it would be if it were
morally real. He argues only that it is indirectly normative in that it entails
a particular communal practice, a practice that is demonstrably necessary
for bringing political life into line with the best available specific conceptions
of what is good. Spragens calls this practice "the politics of reason." 44
Spragens derives the concept of practical reason from what Aristotle
termed "phronesis." Phronesis refers to practical wisdom, or the virtue of
reasoning well for the "'attainment of truth in things that are humanly
good and bad."' 45
Applied to the polis, phronesis conceives of politics as a practice, a form
of social, cooperative activity, with a good internal to that activity and
standards of excellence in performance." The crux of phronesis is that it
43. Id. at 118.
44. Id. at 113. See generally id. at 112-145.
45. Id. at 23 (footnote omitted) (quoting A~isroma, NicoMACHEcAN ETmcs bk. 6, at 5
(J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin Books 1955)).
46. Id. at 182 (quoting ALASDAm MACINTYRE, AFTER VmrUE: A STuDY iN MoRi THEoiy
175 (2d ed. 1984).
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asks us to accept the truth value of ideas about the good that are derived
from this practice, despite the good's ontologically unstable status.
Spragens believes that the conception of practical reason was alive in the
Enlightenment intuition that the life of reason is somehow linked to the
achievement of a good society. However, Spragens also claims that this
intuition was hazy at best because of the seventeenth century revolution in
metaphysics which replaced classical teleology with the belief that reality
consists purely of matter in motion. As a result of this shift, science and
philosophy became committed to a truncated conception of reason as pure
logic, according to which reason is capable of calculating, weighing, and
measuring. Anything that cannot be deduced by one of these means cannot
be said to be right or true according to reason.
With this conception of reason, modem political philosophy inevitably
rejected the idea that the good can be normative even if distilled from a
rational process. It argues instead that the good is a matter of irrational
preference. The ascendancy of "technical rationality" led to the conception
of politics as purely instrumental, "a means to an end outside of itself that
is established prerationally." 47 Hobbes, whom Spragens portrays as the key
figure in this development, reformulated the end of human flourishing
simply as the end of self-preservation. Since he perceived no other compelling
final end, but only irrational desire, he understood the good in purely
negative terms as the avoidance of death. According to Spragens, "practical
reason within the modem empiricist tradition remains to this day essentially
what, in outline at least, it was for Hobbes, namely "a theoretical science
of cause and effect that can become technically efficacious when conjoined
with stipulated purposes."' 8 In the course of its development, the theoretical
foundation of democratic liberalism has retained this instrumentalism. Thus,
both utilitarianism (greatest good for the greatest number) and liberal
skepticism (mutual toleration because all values are relative) fail to provide
a normative basis for political obligation because they are committed to a
distinction between fact and value that renders value arbitrary.
Having described the manner in which he ;believes modem political
philosophy got off the track, Spragens dedicates the bulk of his argument
to the proposition that the classical view of politics is demonstrably correct,
and that the normative standard for the conduct of political life is reasonably
specifiable. To do so, he draws analogies from the polis of scientific practice
and the polis of linguistic communication. 49 In each he finds a "physiology
of rational practice" which manifests "the intrinsic 'politics' of practical
reason." 50 Having thus uncovered "[a]t the heart of reason" a "character-
47. Id.
48. Id. at 31.
49. Id. at 102.
50. Id. at 90.
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istic pattern of procedures and institutions," 5' he asks whether the norms
of conduct essential to effective cognitive activity in science and language
are also applicable to political activity. He answers with a "qualified
affirmative," stating that "[t]he type of politics warranted by this philo-
sophically recast version of rationalism turns out to be a particular concep-
tion of democratic liberalism." 52
According to Spragens, the "epistemic bedrock of science" 53 throughout
most of modern history was 'direct appeal to facts."'M Drawn from the
seventeenth century revolution that also directed the development of political
philosophy, this epistemology assumed that the facts were universal, un-
changing, and objective, and that observation is a matter of passively
receiving sense impressions. Scientific progress was characterized as a con-
tinuous accretion of knowledge about facts, accomplished through a rigor-
ously explicated logic of observation.
In contrast to this characterization, Spragens identifies a new conception
of scientific rationality which portrays science as a group enterprise in which
communities, institutions, and processes are conjoined to interpret what is
scientifically true. Underlying this radically different view of science is a
view of truth as "our apprehension of the structure of our world" 55 rather
than universal and unchanging essence. This science is rational because it
must be carried out according to certain principles, and progressive because
it yields ever greater understanding to our minds. Yet it is subject to change
as structures are developed and then discarded, in a never-ending quest to
understand better.
Spragens identifies in linguistic theory a similar set of divergent charac-
terizations. According to the old linguistics, language is purely representa-
tional, and the business of linguistics is to clarify its terms by linking them
to their unambiguous referents. This view presupposes the world to be
composed of discrete bits and pieces of material things. Language then
becomes simply a calculus employed to assert or deny facts. In contrast,
the new linguistics asserts that words do not have meanings. Instead, people
mean certain things and employ language as an instrument to express them.
Therefore, to understand how language means anything, we must look not
to syntax but to the pragmatics of usage, the network of practices that
inform any successful speech act. As it turns out, these practices are also
rational in that they are organized around certain rules for the performance
of speech acts. Thus, as in the case of scientific truth, linguistic meaning
51. Id. at 113.
52. Id. at 115.
53. Id. at 59.
54. Id. (quoting JomH HERSCHEL, A PRELenARY DISCOURSE OF THE STUDY OF NATURAL
PimosoPHY 59 (London, Longman's 1831)).
55. Id. at 117.
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is revealed as a moving object whose basis is found not in any logical
relationship to objective universals, but in the adherence to certain rules of
practice.
To explicate the rules of the scientific enterprise, Spragens turns to the
work of Michael Polanyi56 and Robert Merton.57 Polanyi, in particular, was
concerned to describe the mode of governance in what he termed "the
republic of science." 58 He found that science requires an animating consen-
sus, criteria of citizenship, and attendant modes of participation, as well as
criteria and procedures for decision making. The animating consensus
consists of a common goal, in this case, the attainment of scientific truth.
The basic decision-rule is to accept the force of the better argument. This
rule of authority entails certain procedural requirements: impartiality of
adjudication (replication of experimentation, peer review); organized skep-
ticism toward accepted truths; protection of dissent (with the expectation
of respect for the weight of received truth as also having been distilled
through the same rational process); obligation to attend the ideas of others;
and the requirement of fairness, or self-restraint, in presenting one's own
arguments. Finally, citizenship depends on sharing the animating purpose
of the enterprise and recognizing the procedural restraints under which one
must operate. Yet admission to citizenship must be nondiscriminatory, and
there must be moral equality among citizens. Although there will be a
hierarchy of influence, it depends on relative merit assigned by public
opinion and is subject to change.
What emerges from this, according to Spragens, is a "pattern of inter-
related consensus, authority, liberty, and participation." 5 9 It is a system in
which authority is neutral, based on persuasion rather than power, and
sovereignty is dispersed among all citizens of the "republic." Most impor-
tant, this enterprise is motivated by a common desire to seek the truth,
with a dual understanding that there will always be disagreement about its
substance and that our common knowledge of it will always be partial and
conditional. It is this understanding that entails the particular institutions,
values, and procedures characteristic of the republic of science, for these
practices produce the truth with the greatest explanatory power. Such truth
is not timeless or perfect. Instead, it is merely rational and unarbitrary.
Reviewing the theory of linguistic communication, Spragens finds that it,
too, depends upon norms, in this case norms of "communicative compe-
tence," which comprise the republic of rational discourse. As in the case
of science, these rules follow from the goal of the enterprise and its principle
56. See MIcHA PoLAyi, SCiENCE, FAIH AND SOCtETY (1964).
57. See ROBERT K. MERTON, Science and the Social Order, and Science and Democratic
Social Structure, in SoCIAl THEORY AND SocALu STRucTuRE 537-61 (rev. ed. 1957).
58. POLAMi, supra note 56, at 16.
59. SPRAmNos, supra note 7, at 108.
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of authority, which again disperses sovereignty among all participants.
Spragens claims that the conception of truth that animates science is
analogous to that of the good in politics. Each is "open-ended," "antidog-
matic," and "experimental. '" 60 Like scientists seeking the truth, citizens in
a rational society do not agree about what is good. The good
serves not as a substantive a priori answer to the questions politics
addresses, but rather as the orienting question for a free and humane
political project. It is a question-"what is our common good and how
do we achieve it?"-that is capable of functioning in an analogous way
to the question "what is true?" in the theoretical disciplines. 1
Following Polanyi's conclusion that the republic of science must be liberal
and democratic, Spragens asserts that conceptions of the good can only
have value analogous to that of scientific truth if they are deduced from a
process designed to elicit consensus from morally autonomous individuals.
In general, this means that politics must be governed by the same principles
of authority and citizenship that Polanyi set out for science. Thus, any
proposed answer to the question "what is to be done?" must explain how
it contributes to the fruition of human life. To do this, it must propose an
interpretation of human existence within which the action to be taken makes
sense, then explain how it will achieve that goal. Of course, all practical
arguments can be disputed because, like scientific truths, they are not
amenable to irrefutable demonstration. However, again like scientific truths,
practical arguments are not for that reason "arbitrary" or "cognitively
empty. "6
The characteristics identified by Spragens as most crucial in a legitimate
political culture are quite familiar. They include participation, liberty,
equality, rights, and what might be called informed democracy. This should
not come as a surprise, for the originality of Spragens' argument is not in
the values it finds normative, but rather in the way it makes them so. On
the other hand, Spragens' liberal alchemy does have a particular flavor,
which it would be unfair not to attempt to convey. Spragens' main concern
is to reconcile liberal individualism with the communitarian critique of it;
he does this by endorsing a form of democracy focused on "homonoia,"
or friendship. He tries to find a balance that recognizes a limited capacity
to discover common conceptions of the good.
All this can best be felt in Spragens' conceptions of liberty and partici-
pation. Participation is an obligation of civic virtue because individual
aspirations are the raw data from which the common good must be distilled.
Yet, in Spragens' mind, participation is not the same thing as simple interest
60. Id. at 120.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 121.
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articulation, but a matter of sharing in a collective judgment as to what
the common good is in light of all the interests put on the table. It involves
an act of imagination that focuses on the interests of the group to which
one belongs, rather than on simply getting what one wants. At a psycho-
logical level, it involves perceiving oneself and one's aspirations as existing
primarily in a group context. Like participation, individual liberty, in
Spragens' estimation, serves group ends. Since outcomes depend on the
force of the best argument, liberty is necessary to ensure that argumentation
is not deformed by leaving out or overemphasizing any one set of interests.
Liberty is not grounded in the "putative right of the individual to 'freedom
of expression. "'6
The emphasis on common good leads back to liberalism's focus on the
individual through the observation that no outcome can truly be good or
common that does not respect individual autonomy. Hence Spragens' con-
ception of equality emphasizes the need for absolute moral equality, but
not economic equality. Similarly, "a right is quite simply a demand that
can be predicated on the essential attributes of a rational being."' ' What
emerges from all this is a rather traditional liberal view, qualified by a
heightened recognition that our individual aspirations cannot be separated
from our common fate. It is this recognition, that our individual senses of
fulfillment depend on common action, which grants normative force to the
process whereby we decide how to act.
The force of Spragens' argument depends primarily on the aptness of the
analogy he draws between science and politics. Therefore, it is worth noting
that he draws it not by assimilating politics to science, but by assimilating
science to politics. In other words, he decisively rejects the concept of truth
as "theoria" in favor of the concept of truth as "praxis." However, if one
accepts this aspect of Spragehs' argument, it becomes difficult to accept his
further claim to stand outside the debate between conventionalism and
moral realism.
To assert that authority in a rational enterprise is vested democratically
in the conscience of all participants, [he states], is not necessarily to
deny the supposition of the natural law tradition .... It is only to
recognize that, in practice, any putative jus naturale must be validated
by a form of jus gentium.
Strictly speaking, this claim may be true. However, the power of Spragens'
argument rests upon a conception of mutable goodness. According to this
conception, the truthfulness of goodness is a function of how well it explains
things to our changeful imaginations. This is the conception he develops in
63. Id. at 153.
64. Id. at 157.
65. Id. at 169 (emphasis in original).
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his analogy of science and politics, and in my view, it is hostile toward
moral realism, if not logically irreconcilable with it.
What are the consequences of Spragens' concept for constitutional theory?
Like Walker, Spragens negotiates between the moral absolutism of natural,
or higher, law approaches and the self-denying incoherence of liberal ap-
proaches that endorse the principle of majoritarianism. Yet he also accom-
plishes something more, for one cannot help but recognize that our
Constitution sets out a rational process of self-governance which presupposes
the moral autonomy of its citizens. Thus, Spragens' argument has the
advantage of providing normative force to that which the Constitution
actually does. In other words, it has great explanatory power. 66
Of course, the detailed structural requirements of rational constitutional
praxis are not self-evident. For example, that Spragens finds political
legitimacy in a process does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
constitutional theories derived from his argument will be proceduralist or
especially concerned with avoiding judicial activism. The corollary principle
of participation does require democracy, yet it does not subordinate all
practices to majority preference. In this regard, the constitutional entailments
of Spragens' theory are less definite than Walker's unequivocal endorsement
of judicial self-restraint.6 7
Despite the different concerns and underlying commitments of their
arguments, Spragens and Walker share a fundamental insight that normative
theory cannot evade, and must incorporate, the modem intuition of moral
indeterminacy. Together, they demonstrate that this is possible regardless
of whether or not one believes in the existence of an independent moral
order. Having moved the theoretical debate about political obligation beyond
this impasse, they open up a new challenge to those who would apply this
fund of insight to the elaboration of theories of constitutional interpretation.
66. Walker argues that his theory has explanatory power because it accounts for the
Constitution's moral invocations. See supra text accompanying notes 9-14. However, Augus-
tinian ethics, especially when presented by Walker as an antidote to the overly optimistic moral
realism of Moore, emphasizes the modest role of the state. "In Augustine's estimate," writes
R. A. Markus, "the task of the state in the economy of salvation would be rather to establish
the conditions in which men may work out their own salvation in relative peace and security
than actively to promote their individual salvation through legislation and coercion." R. A.
Markus, Augustine, St., in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PIm.osoPHY 198, 205-06 (Paul Edwards ed.,
1967). This ethical stance would appear to entail a constitution much less overtly moralistic
than our own, and thus there is a dissonance between Walker's theory and the" Constitution.
In my view, in any case, moralistic language is a far less definitive attribute of our Constitution
than is the framework of government it establishes.
67. Walker emphasizes that judicial self-restraint should be "proximate" rather than
principled because it arises out of pragmatic awareness of mankind's (and one's own) fallen
state, rather than from a positivistic theory of constitutional legitimacy.
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